The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-making by Footer, Mary E.




The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-
making
Mary E. Footer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the International Trade Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-making, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 653 (1996-1997)





The most striking aspect of the new World Trade Organization
(WTO)' is the extent to which it preserves and consolidates the body
of law and practice which has evolved out of the development of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 and related instru-
ments. Such preservation and consolidation is deliberate as the pre-
amble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (Marrakesh Agreement) makes clear.3 The mechanism
chosen for the transition from the GAT-T to the WTO was designed to
provide a degree of continuity, stability and thereby predictability in
the multilateral trading system. Its occurrence is due, in no small
measure, to the active role of the GATT Secretariat in pursuing this
initiative and to the willingness of representatives of governments and
* International Development Law Institute, Rome, Italy and Centre for Commercial Law
Studies, Queen Mary & Westfield College, London, U.K.
I The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 6 (GATT
Secretariat 1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh, LEGAL TEXTS].
2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr), as amended, was opened for signa-
ture at Geneva on Oct. 30, 1947, and entered into force for 22 of the 23 original signatories on
Jan. 1, 1948. T.I.A.S. No. 1700; 55 U.N.T.S. 187; UN Doc.Sales No. 1947.11/10, vol. I. See
Marrakesh, LEGAL TExTs, supra note 1, at 485 [hereinafter GATT 1947, LEGAL TEx-s] for the
current text.
3 See Marrakesh, LEGAL TEXTS, the preamble, supra note 1, at 6:
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading
system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade
liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives un-
derlying this multilateral trading system...
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the European Communities, present at the close of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations at Marrakesh, to agree to it.
The Marrakesh Agreement is all the more extraordinary because
the antecedent of GATT law and practice was not a succession of one
international organization by another international organization nor
of treaty succession. Instead, the GATT 1947 - the GAIT which
came into force on 1 January 19484 - was integrated into the WTO
Agreement, as part of the GATT 1994. The GATT 1994 contains the
text of the old GATT 1947, together with all its amendments, correc-
tions, decisions and so on, to which were added six understandings
and a protocol (consisting of new tariff schedules).5
This incorporation of GATF law and practice, or GAIT acquis,6
established by the contracting parties to the GATT, is not novel. An
acquis communautaire was used during each successive enlargement
of the European Communities to ensure that new Member States ac-
cepted, without reservation, the original treaties and their political
objectives as well as all the decisions taken by Community institutions
since their entry into force.7 In the case of both the European Com-
munities and the GATT/WTO, an acquis has been a powerful tool in
the process of economic integration. However, the path taken to eco-
nomic integration differentiates the GATTIWTO from the European
Communities. In the case of the GATT, economic integration re-
sulted from the successive practice of the contracting parties to a mul-
tilateral treaty. In contrast, the European Communities were
4 GATT 1947, LEGAL TRXrs, supra note 2.
5 See Marrakesh, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1 at 20-23. Article 1 of GATT 1994 is the first
Agreement in Annex 1A, appended to the WTO Agreement. Id.
6 The term acquis is coined from its more familiar usage in European Community law where
"acquis communautaire" refers to "[t]he Community patrimony: the whole body of rules, princi-
ples, agreements, declarations, resolutions, positions, opinions, objectives, and practices concern-
ing the European Communities, whether or not binding in law, which has developed since their
establishment and which has been accepted by the Community institutions and the Member
States as governing their activities." See A.G. TOTH, 1 OXFoRD ENCYLOPAEDIA EUR. COMMU-
Nrry L: INSTITUTONAL L. 9 (1990); but see G. Marceau, Transition from GATT to WTO, 29
J.W.T.147 n.1 (1995), who disputes the use of the term 'GATT acquis,' as understood in the
wider European law sense since, in her view, GATI case-law does not form part of the GATT
1994. However, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade
Organization and the Evolution of the GATTDispute Settlement System Since 1948,31 COMMON
MARKET L.RE-v. 1157, 1207 (1994).
7 Now a legally binding obligation taken up in Articles 2-4 of the Acts of Accession in 1972,
1979, 1985 and 1995, and in the 1992 Treaty on a European Economic Area (EEA), as amended,
between the EC, ECSC, and 12 Member States on the one hand and six of the seven EFTA
Member States (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Sweden) on the other as
part of a process of broader European integration.
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integrated through the use of a specific organizational and institu-
tional framework within the European Union.
Although delegates to the first meeting of the newly established
UN subordinate body of the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) held in February 19468 intended that there should be an
International Trade Organization, or ITO, and that negotiations
should commence for the progressive reduction in tariffs on trade,9
the course of history decided otherwise. The ECOSOC produced a
final text of a General Agreement which was devoted to the reciprocal
reduction of tariffs on a multilateral basis and included "general
clauses" of obligations designed to protect the tariff obligations. 10 By
the end of 1947, the Havana Conference convened to complete the
ITO Charter"-but failed to muster sufficient support for the ITO due
largely to the repeated intransigence of the U.S. Congress in 1948 and
subsequent years. As Jackson notes, 12 a variety of restraints, includ-
ing political restraints exercised by sovereign governments or re-
straints inherent to the democratic processes in national systems, can
be a powerful force in limiting the options for pragmatic rule-making
and the organization of economic activity at the international level.
Until this point, the GATT and the formation of an ITO had
been interlinked. No one had anticipated that the GATT should be-
come an international organization; it was to operate under the um-
brella of the ITO when the latter came into existence. The GATT
entered into force on January 1, 1948, ahead of the ITO Charter. To
wait for the ITO would have been too costly since the GATT con-
sisted of thousands of reciprocally agreed tariff concessions. There
were fears that these concessions would come into the public domain
and traders would act upon them, thereby disrupting world trade.
In terms of value, those transaction costs needed to be minimized
still further if the General Agreement was to achieve its intended
goals. Some of the parties had constitutional procedures which re-
8 1 UN ECOSOC Res. 13, UN Doc. E/22 (1946).
9 However, a draft outline of what was to become the GATr was only published as an
annex to the 1946 London Preparatory Committee Meeting Report, see Annexure 10 to the
"Report on Procedures for Giving Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter for an Interna-
tional Trade Organization by Means of a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Among Mem-
bers of the Preparatory Committee" in Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (London, Oct.-Nov., 1946), UN
Doc. EPC/33!51.
10 GAIT 1947, LEGAL TEXTs, supra note 2, at 485, et seq.
11 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, held at Havana, Cuba, from Nov.
21, 1947, to March 24, 1948; UN Doc. E/Conf. 2/78, UN Sales Publication No. 48.11.DA.
12 JoiiN H. JACKSON, THm WORLD TRADiNG, SYSTEM 299-308 (1989).
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quired that parts of the GATT be subject to the approval of their leg-
islatures. Since these same parties needed to submit the final draft of
the ITO Charter to their legislative assemblies in late 1948 or the fol-
lowing year, many feared that getting GATF through in its entirety
might jeopardize the outcome of the ITO. The solution was to adopt
a Protocol of Provisional Application. As a result of its adoption,
eight of the original contracting parties agreed to apply the GATT
"provisionally on and after 1 January 1948" while the remaining par-
ties agreed to do so as soon thereafter as possible. This allowed most
countries, which required legislative authority for the whole package,
to seek executive or administrative approval to giving immediate ef-
fect to parts of the GAIT. 3
Bereft of any organs, the GATT evolved three principal bodies to
administer the General Agreement: the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
acting jointly,14 the Council of Representatives, and the Interim Com-
mission for the International Trade Organization (ICITO). These
three GATT bodies'- have been entrusted with the development of
the organizational structure and institutional procedures which existed
on the eve of the creation of the WTO. The lack of a true organiza-
tional basis led at least one commentator to describe the GATT as "a
model of law as process" 6 and, more particularly, as "an amalgam of
specific obligations, codes of conduct, and commercial policy consider-
ations, working through consensus and organized persuasion.'
17
13 The effect of the Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA) was to fully implement Part I,
containing the most favored nation (MFN) clause and tariff obligations, and Part III, containing
mostly procedural and treaty provisions. Part II, Articles III to XXIII - containing the substan-
tive obligations relating to national treatment, customs procedures, quantitative restrictions, sub-
sidies, anti-dumping and the dispute settlement provisions, was to be implemented "to the fullest
extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." The Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 77, para. 1 (GATT Secretariat 1986).
14 GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUmE TO GATT LAW AND PRAcIcE, Art. XXV:1, 811
(GATr Secretariat, 6th ed., 1994) [herinafter GATr ANALYTICAL INDEX]. See infra text accom-
panying note 19 for a more complete description of the significance of this terminology.
15 See id. at 1009.
16 JAMES FAWCETr, LAW AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 90 (1982).
17 Id. It also exemplifies Ordnungspolitiek, i.e., an order policy or framework policy, formed
by government representatives. P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, THE CHANGING STRucruRE OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 171-72 (1981). Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Eco-
nomic Theory and International Economic Law: On the Tasks of a Legal Theory of International
Economic Order, in Trm S-Rucrupm AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS iN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY DocrINE AND THEORY 229 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds.,
1993) [hereinafter THE S-RucruP AND PROCESS].
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B. Synopsis
This article examines the way in which parties to a multilateral
treaty, like the GAT' 1947, have developed institutional and proce-
dural mechanisms capable of allowing the GATT to function as a
"model of law as process" and to provide the basis for the formation
of a new international economic organization, the WTO. A compara-
tive institutional approach18 is used to assess one particular area of
GATI' practice - consensus decision-making - and, thereby, to test
the relative effectiveness of the institutional and procedural mecha-
nisms developed by the contracting parties to the General Agreement
in the application of trade rules and disciplines, as well as in the reso-
lution of conflicts arising from the elaborate web of concessions and
trade policy considerations.
It is acknowledged that consensus can also be utilized as a
method of law-making. However, the normative, or rule-making, ca-
pacity of the GATT contracting parties (and linked thereto, their
power to interpret the General Agreement) will not be addressed
within the confines of this article.
Attention is focused on development of the consensus technique
within the GATT as a means of decision-making exercised by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES 19 and the Council. The process under
the General Agreement is compared and contrasted with its use in
other international fora and on a regional level within the European
Communities under the Luxembourg Accords of 1966. It Will be
shown that different participatory models elicit different methods of
treatment.
This contribution also looks at the way in which the practice of
decision-making by consensus has been formalized at the interna-
tional level by similar mechanisms to the GATT, i.e. primarily within
the fora of international conferences or conferences of parties to in-
18 The comparative institutional approach is understood as the public choice analysis of the
relative effectiveness of institutions in solving social problems, based on their differing levels of
participation and the imperfections in the participatory processes that are inherent in their struc-
ture. Edward L. Rubin, Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 463
(1995) (reviewing NEIL K. KoMESAR, IxER-cr ALTERNATVES: CHoosNG INSTrruTIONs IN
LAW, ECONOMIC A PuBLIc POLICY (1994)).
19 According to Article XXV:1 GATT, wherever the designation CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES appears in the General Agreement, it means the contracting parties acting jointly and is
primarily aimed at the contracting parties' powers to interpret the General Agreement by way of
(i) decision making; (ii) Reports of Panels and Working Parties; (iii) Chairman's rulings; (iv)
Council action; or (v) exceptionally, a legal opinion from the Director General of the GATT; see
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 14, at 811. See also JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAw OF GATr 126-132 (1969).
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ternational conventions. The results are then compared and con-
trasted with similar developments within the GATT and the more
recent WTO.
20
II. THiE ROLE OF CONSENSUS IN GATT DECISION-MAKING
A. Some Preliminary Remarks on Use of the Word "Consensus"
.The use of the word "consensus" in the domestic context and in
international relations frequently gives rise to ambiguity. When it is
combined with words like "procedure," "process" or "technique,"
"consensus" denotes a specific form of decision-making. When it is
used alone, "consensus" usually denotes the product of that process.
Consensus can thus function both as a technique and as the result of
that technique, thereby giving rise to much confusion.21 Here, consen-
sus means decisions of international organizations, or other interna-
tional institutions, that , have been adopted by acclamation.22
Decision-making by consensus is not mutually exclusive of decisions
taken by majority voting. In fact, the two are frequently found in the
alternative and thus compliment one another, as in Article IX:1 WTO
Agreement.2 3
B. Historical Antecedents of Consensus in the Decision-making
Process
Consensus gradually evolved as a decision-making technique in
international fora which is distinguishable from the classical non-ob-
jection procedure. 24 Even so, consensus as a procedure owes some-
20 An example of a practice which has been retained is the continuation of decision-making
by consensus which is explicitly recognized in the WTO Agreement, Article IX, sub-paragraph 1.
Marrakesh, LEGAL TE xrs, supra note 1, at 11, art. IX, sub-para. 1. See also text accompanying
note 23, infra.
21 Karl Zemanek, Majority Rule and Consensus Technique In Law-Making Diplomacy, in
THE STRucruRE AND PRocEss, supra note 17, at 857. Zemanek points out that in international
relations consensus is frequently also used, independently of its procedural meaning, to denote
opinlo iuris, one of the constituent elements necessary for the formation of a rule of customary
international law (the other being State practice). Id.
22 HENRY G. ScHERmERs*& NmrLs M. BLOKER, INTERNATIONAL INsTITUTIONAL LAW 505-
506 (1996).
23 See Marrakesh, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 11. The relevant section of Article IX:1 of
the WTO Agreement states:
The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under
GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by con-
sensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting.
24 Zemanek, supra note 21, at 863. See generally, Barry Buzan, Negotiating by Consensus:
Developments in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L 324 (1981).
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thing to the long-standing "non-objection" procedure of the General
Assembly.25  What distinguishes consensus from the procedure of
non-objection is the elimination of controversial points through the
use of negotiation or mediation in order to bring about consensus or
agreement.26 In this sense, consensus is positive and pro-active be-
cause it embodies an effective and recognized technique for reaching a
decision. In contrast, the process of non-objection is negative in char-
acter and defensive because it symbolizes "a consensus to refrain from
taking any decision at the price of the paralysis of action ....
Prior to the widespread use of consensus in decision-making, in-
ternational organizations commonly required that decisions receive
the common consent of every participating nation, for example, una-
nimity. Anything less would fail to correspond to the doctrine of sov-
ereign equality and the principle that no international decision should
be imposed against the will of any State.28 As Schermers and Blokker
have noted, decision-making in international fora follows a pattern es-
tablished in early national and other communities. The requirement
of unanimity is often seen as a requirement for a compromise. Im-
plicit in this notion is "the existence of 'invisible' minorities behind the
seeming unanimity," such minorities being composed of opponents of
certain decisions which have been forced to agree.29 They proceed to
note that:
[H]istorically and theoretically, the transition to the majority principle is
implied in the imperfection of the procedures of unanimity. At the na-
tional level, this transition could take place freely as a result of the exist-
ence of a sense of belonging to one community sharing certain basic
values. This "consensus" is accompanied by a willingness to accept out-
voting in day-to-day decisions. The minority in such decisions taken to-
day might be the majority behind decisions of tomorrow. Moreover, the
shared basic values remain unaffected or change only slowly.30
25 The technique was purportedly used at the notorious 19th Session of the General Assem-
bly in 1964, during which no votes were taken, to avoid applying Article 19 of the UN Charter to
the Soviet Union, France, and some other States. (Article 19 of the UN Charter provides that
where a UN Member is in arrears it is precluded from voting). This is a typical example of
decision-making by the non-objection procedure rather than consensus strictu sensu; see Char-
pentier, J. 'La procddure de non-objection (A propos d'une crise constitutionelle de l'ONU)' 70
R.G.D.LP. 862-77 (1966).
26 Zemanek, supra note 21, at 863.
27 See C. Wilfred Jenks, Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simple Majorities
and Consensus as Modes of Decision in International Organization, in CAMBRrDGE EssAys IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD McNAiR 48, 62 (R.Y. Jennings ed., 1965).
28 See Stephen Zamora, Voting in International Economic Organizations, 74 AM. J.INT'L L
566, 573-74 (1980).
29 SCHER-MERS & BLOKXER, supra note 22, at 513.
30 Id
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Reminiscent of that era are decisions, currently taken by the
Council of Ministers of the European Union, under the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union (TEU), which call for the definition of a common posi-
tion3' and joint action 32 with respect to Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) 33 matters under the second pillar of the Treaty.34 The
resort to unanimity reinforces the intergovernmental and political
character of CFSP and sets the policy apart from other matters cov-
ered under the Treaty. At the same time, it ensures that European
Union decisions will only be made after national governments have
reached policy decisions on matters in their vital interest.35
In the same vein, Article XXX GATT calls for the unanimous
decision of the Contracting Parties to change Part I, (MFN under Ar-
ticle I, the tariff bindings under Article II, and the tariff schedules)
Article XXIX (relationship of the General Agreement to the Havana
Charter - subsequently a dead letter) and Article XXX itself. Seen
by some as a reluctance of nations to give up their sovereignty, 36 this
Article had more to do with the belief, still prevalent in the post-war
period, that a multilateral convention expressed the common will of
contracting parties and, therefore, required their common will to
amend it. The trend since then has been to allow amendment of many
multilateral conventions by a majority of parties if it is in the interest
of the international community.
37
Current practice is supported by Article 40 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties of 1969,38 which allows parties to a
multilateral convention to determine the content of any amendment
clauses which will govern their treaty relations. Article 40 requires
31 Article J.8(2) TEU
32 Article J.3 TEU requires that the decision on whether or not to take joint action be a
unanimous one, except where, according to sub-paragraph 2, the matter involves implementation
of a joint action in which case qualified majority voting is permitted.
33 The CFSP is an outgrowth and codification of some twenty years practice of the Member
States in the area of European Political Cooperation (EPC). It was first recognized in treaty
form by the Single European Act of 1986, entered into force on July 1, 1987, and made a number
of substantive amendments to the EC Treaty, 1987 O.J. (L169) 1 but is now codified at Maas-
tricht, in the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
34 M. R. Eaton, Common Foreign and Security Policy, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAsnMcirr
TREATY, 215, 217-19 (David O'Keefe & Patrick M. Iwoney eds., 1994).
35 We will return to this point when we compare it to the process of consensus decision-
making, introduced into the European Communities by the Luxembourg Accords of 1966 to
avert a Community "constitutional" crisis. See infra note 103.
36 JACKSON, supra note 19, at 73; see also Zamora, supra note 28, at 579.
37 I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 426 (1994).
38 Entered into force January 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), 58 U.K.T.S.
(1980); see further Sm IAN SINCLAIR, THm VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2nd
ed., Manchester University Press 1984).
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that all contracting parties be notified of a proposal for amendment
and of their right to participate in preparatory negotiations leading to
an amendment but does not require that every contracting State
agree to the amendment.3 9 However, that same article reiterates the
principle that States cannot be bound against their will; thus, the
amending agreement does not bind any contracting party which does
not become a party to the amending agreement.40 Similarly, the una-
nimity requirement became an issue during negotiations on the Gen-
eral Agreement in 1947 when it was initially proposed that only a two-
third majority be required for amendments to Part I because corre-
sponding articles in the Havana Charter could be amended with such
a majority.41 In line with Jackson's observation - that the unanimity
requirement for amendment of the General Agreement, found in Ar-
ticle XXX GATr, owes much to the way in which international trade
was previously organized along bilateral lines42 - it was decided in
1947 that "[T]he General Agreement is a trade agreement and the
rule in ordinary trade agreements is that they can only be modified
with the unanimous consent of the parties taking part in them....
Ultimately, a variation on unanimity to amend the General Agree-
ment was accepted. Amendments, other than those to Part I of the
GATT 1947 (MFN and the tariff bindings), Article XXIX, and the
amending article itself, Article XXX, could become effective ". .. in
respect of those contracting parties which accept them, upon accept-
ance by two-thirds of the contracting parties and thereafter for each
other contracting party upon acceptance by it."44
39 Article 40, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties state:
1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, the amendment of multilateral treaties shall be
governed by the following paragraphs.
2. Any proposal to amend a multilateral treaty as between all the parties must be notified
to all the contracting States, each one of which shall have the right to take part in:
(a) the decision as to the action to be taken in regard to such proposal;
(b) the negotiation and conclusion of any agreement for the amendment of the treaty.
3. Every State entitled to become a party to the treaty shall also be entitled to become a
party to the treaty as amended.
40 The relevant paragraph 4 of Article 40 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
states:
The amending agreement does not bind any State already a party to the treaty which does
not become a party to the amending agreement; article 30, paragraph 4(b), applies in rela-
tion to such State [i.e. where one State is party to both treaty whereas the other State is
party to only one of those two treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs
their mutual rights and obligations].
41 See Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Employment: Tariff Committee (Geneva, Apr.-Oct. 1947), UN Doe. EPCT/
TACIPVI15, p. 6 et seq., reported in GATT Analytical Index, supra note 14, at 930-31.
42 JACKSON, supra note 19, at 81.
43 Report of the Second Session, supra note 41, at 931.
44 Article XXX:1 GATT 1947, LEGAL Tn~crs, supra note 2, at 531.
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On the international plane, the battle for majority rule was princi-
pally fought in the League of Nations45 and reached a high point in
those international organizations (mostly international economic
ones) formed during the last years of the Second World War. Major-
ity rule, either simple or qualified, was carried through into the con-
stituent instruments of several of these organizations, established after
1945.46 As previously noted, the General Agreement also made some
allowances for the use of majority rule on amendments. The extent to
which this basic principle carried over into the WTO and was rein-
forced by new rules on amendments to the WTO Agreement or the
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto - which involve de-
cision-making by consensus, in addition to qualified majority voting -
is dealt with hereunder. Some of the larger powers remained suspi-
cious of the process of majority, seeing it as a threat to their vital
interests. This occasionally led to a call for weighted voting on sub-
stantive matters, for example, the twin Bretton Woods institutions of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),47 or even recourse to
decision-making by consensus.
48
C. The Origins of Consensus as a Decision-making Process by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES
The GATT, like the IMF and World Bank, was a post-war crea-
tion; however, the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATI' never
embraced weighted voting for decision-making. Since the adoption of
the first contribution scale at the Second Session of the Contracting
Parties in 1948, each GATT contracting party and associated govern-
ment has paid contributions to the GATT budget based on its share in
the volume of foreign trade of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.49
45 Zemanek, supra note 21, at 859; SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 22, at 513
46 The trend towards majority rule began in the latter part of the 19th and early part of the
20th century with administrative and technical unions, such as the International Telegraphic
Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU), see ScnaERS & BLOKKER, supra note
22, at 510; Zamora, supra note 28, at 574-75. It should be noted that since 1984 decisions in
UPU, Congresses are take by "common consent" with resort to voting where this cannot be
achieved, as in the WTO; see ScHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 22.
47 See Zamora, supra note 28, at 576-78: Zemanek, supra note 21, at 859-60.
48 SCHmMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 22, §783 at 514.
49 The actual share of the CONTRAcTiNG PARTES in total world trade was calculated on the
basis of foreign trade figures for the past three years and included in the scale of contribution
was a minimum percentage contribution of 0.03% for CONTRAcrNG PARTIES and associated
governments whose trade value was at or below that percentage of the total trade of the CON.
TRACTING PARTIES; see GATr ANALYICAL INDEX, supra note 14, at 1037. It is to be expected
that WTO Members' contributions to the new organization will be along similar lines since it has
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Unlike the 1MF50 and World Bank, the GATT contribution has never
been linked to an apportionment of votes in the Ministerial Confer-
ence, for example, the plenary session or general assembly of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES or in the GATT Council. This fapt is
partly due to the lack of organizational structure and, hence, institu-
tions in the GATT. Contracting parties to the GATT derive their
ability to meet and take decisions from their adhesion to a multilateral
treaty. This is supported by the wording of Article XXV:1 GATT,
which speaks of contracting parties meeting "from time to time for the
purpose of giving effect to those provisions of this Agreement which
involve joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the oper-
ation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement."
Consequently, the General Agreement is short on decision-mak-
ing procedures, as exemplified by its voting provisions. Article XXV:3
GATT simply provides that "[e]ach contracting party shall be entitled
to one vote at all meetings of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.'
Paragraph 4 of that same Article XXV qualifies this statement by pre-
scribing majority rule; thus: "Except as otherwise provided for in this
Agreement, decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be
taken by a majority of the votes cast."
'52
Decision-making by consensus in GATT practice follows a dis-
cernible trend in other international fora, beginning in the mid-1960's.
Interest in use of the consensus technique increased with the number
of developing countries entering the international system in the wave
of decolonization and their accumulation of large voting majorities in
been decided that the financial regulations should remain based as far as practicable on the law
and practice of the GATr 1947; see Article VII, WTO, Marrakesh, LEGAL TExTs, supra note 1,
at 10.
50 The IMF allocates votes, or quotas - subject to a general review by the Board of Gover-
nors at least every five years; see Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
1988, art. III, sec. 2(a) at 4 - based on a mathematical formula with several variables in order to
determine relative economic strength thus ensuring that the weighted voting power in the re-
spective organization reflects relative economic strength. Id. art. XII, sec. 5; IMF Articles of
Agreement. This practice is followed by the World Bank; see Article V, Section 3 Articles of
Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in 1 BASIC Docu-
MENTS ON INTERNATiONAL ECONOmc LAW 427,439 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds.,
1990), see also Zamora, supra note 28, at 576-77).
51 See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 122.
52 Majority decisions are endorsed in Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure, adopted in 1964,
which provides:
Except as otherwise specified in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, decisions
shall be taken by a majority of the representatives present and voting.
Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Contracting Parties, GATr B.I.S.D. (12th Supp.) at
10-14 (1964); see also GATT ANALYrICAL INDEX, supra note 14, at 1012; see also JACKSON,
supra note 19, at 123.
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international organizations.5 3 Since 1972, more than half of the Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions, and possibly greater than 70%, have been
adopted "without a vote," with consensus resolutions being the pre-
ferred mode of decision-making if the majority wishes to secure the
cooperation of the minority in the implementation of the resolution.
54
Expanded membership of the international society has increased
the divorce of power from voting majorities in international decision-
making. The balance has recently been redressed, to some extent, in
those areas of international law which reach deepest into the fabric of
civil society and the reserved jurisdiction of States; for example, the
formulation of basic standards, the implementation, the elaboration,
and the incorporation into the laws of war of binding international
rules on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
which have given rise to a body of international humanitarian law.
Both the law on the international protection of human rights and hu-
manitarian law rely heavily on national authorities as the primary en-
forcers and disseminators of those laws in the domestic context.
55
Majority voting appeared increasingly useless for decision-mak-
ing in international society because of the danger of alienating power-
ful majorities or producing important disaffected minorities. The
search for a decision-making technique that would enjoy broader-
based support for decisions in a growing, highly divided system is most
apparent when decisions on the management of scarce natural re-
sources and a range of economic transactions are considered.56 As a
result, the emergence of consensus in the UN system within the 1959
UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, created by UN
General Assembly Resolution 1472 (MV), is not surprising. This
Committee could not truly begin its work until its members had recon-
ciled their differences on the method of work and voting procedure to
53 SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 22, at 506, 514; Buzan, supra note 24, at 325.
54 ScHERmFRs & BLOKKER, supra note 22, at 508 (citing MJ. PETERSON, THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY IN WORLD POLrnCs 85 (1986)); see also Miguel Manin-Bosch, How Nations Vote in
the General Assembly of the United Nations, 41 INT'L ORG. 705-24 (1987).
55 See generally Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
261 U.N.T.S. 140, at Articles 48 et seq. and 52 et seq. of the Treaty of Rome that recognize two
fundamental human rights in the "freedom of movement" and "freedom of establishment."
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
56 Schermers and Blokker provide the example of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), established in 1964, which began as a U.N.-sponsored confer-
ence designed to deal with the twin issues of trade and development with particular reference to
developing countries (G.A. Res. 1995 (XIX), 30 December 1964,19 U.N.G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 15
at 1, U.N. Doc. 1/5815 (1965)), where as a rule, decisions are adopted by consensus rather than
by majority vote. ScBERMERs & BLOKKER, supra note 22, at 508-509.
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be adopted.5 7 After two years of discussion, members of the Commit-
tee recorded their understanding that they would continue negotiating
on drafts for the peaceful use of outer space until none of them ob-
jected to the recording of the results as an agreement.58
Such an initial move towards decision-making by consensus is es-
sentially a non-objection procedure or a form of passive consensus.
However, when negotiating positions are assumed, this procedure
more closely resembles a pro-active and deliberate use of the consen-
sus technique in decision-making, often to avoid formal voting mecha-
nisms.59 One example is Rule C-10 of the Rules and Regulations of
the Executive Board of the IMF, which states that "[T]he chairman
shall ordinarily ascertain the sense of the meeting in lieu of a formal
vote. ' 60 Within the GATT, a practice already had emerged in which
the CONTRACTING PARTIES, acting jointly, conform Article
XXV:1 GATT (here understood as the GATT plenary body or gen-
eral assembly where all States parties exercise a vote),61 to routinely
vote on waivers 62 and accessions but to settle all other ordinary busi-
ness by consensus. This was noted as early as 1953 in the Report of
the Working Party on "Arrangements for Japanese Participation,"
where it was stated that ".... the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not
usually proceed to a formal vote in reaching decisions; generally, the
Chairman takes the sense of the meeting ... . 63 Former GATI' Di-
rector-General, Olivier Long, has described the use of consensus in
57 Zemanek, supra note 21, at 862, citing M. LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 27-41
(1972).
58 ld. at 862-63.
59 See M.A.G. VAN MEERHAEGHE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INsTITruTONS 49 (1981); see
also Buzan, supra note 24, at 329 (distinguishes between active consensus which is used to move
the consensus process forward and passive consensus which is characterized as the "mere substi-
tution of consensus for voting as a way of making decisions").
60 Rule C-10 adopted September 25, 1946, amended September 18, 1969 and April 1, 1978 in
By-Laws, Rules and Regulations, International Monetary Fund, 43rd issue, August 1, 1986, p. 23;
see VAN MEERHAEGmE, supra note 59, at 28-30.
61 SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 22, at 14.
62 Article XXV:5 GATT calls for a qualified majority vote:
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by this
Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of
the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half of the contracting par-
ties. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may also by such a vote
(i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which other voting require-
ments shall apply for the waiver of obligations, and
(ii) prescribe such criteria as may be necessary for the application of this paragraph.
Marrakesh, Legal Texts, supra note 1, at 525-26.
63 G/55/Rev.1, adopted on 23 October 1953, B.I.S.D. (2d Supp) at 117, 118, reported in
GATIT ANALYrICAL INDE.X, supra note 14, at 1014; see also OLVER LONG, LAW AND rIs LiMI-
TATIONS IN THE GATT" MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 55 (1987).
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GATT as a way to avoid voting on controversial matters and instead
to seek a compromise solution acceptable to all interested parties. 
64
Switzerland provides a perfect example of the value of this pro-
cess. The Resolution adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in
1958 on the Participation of Switzerland in the work of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES carried with it an understanding that it would
not be possible, from a strictly legal point of view, to give full voting
rights to Switzerland under Articles XXV and XXXII. However, this
lack of full voting rights was considered unimportant since, in the nor-
mal course of business, the CONTRACTING PARTIES did not pro-
ceed to a formal vote but instead ". . the Chairman [would take] the
sense of the meeting and Switzerland would have the same opportu-
nity as contracting parties to express its opinion.
'65
While it is tempting to believe that the early use of consensus
under the General Agreement ensured that decision-making at the
multilateral level would not be dominated by the numerical superior-
ity of any group of States but rather would provide procedural signifi-
cance to variations in states' economic power and status, the opposite
may be true. This belief may be valid for negotiations among States
where law-making decisions are the intended outcome,66 but the same
rationale cannot be applied to ordinary consensus decision-making as
found in sessions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 67
Moreover, it cannot fully explain the preference for consensus in
the early 1950's. At that time, there were relatively few contracting
parties to the GATT; 68 most of those parties were industrialized States
with relatively homogenous trading interests.
The reluctance to engage in formal voting at such sessions and
the preference to allow the chairman to determine that a consensus
had been reached, may have stemmed, as Jackson has suggested,69
64 LONG, supra note 63.
65 GATT ANALYrnCAL INDEX, supra note 14, at 949, 1019.
66 Charney attributes to the consensus approach in multilateral law-making the ability to
maintain "an egalitarian procedure which in practice may assure that multilateral negotiations
reflect the real geopolitical power of the participating nations.. ." Jonathan I. Charney, United
States Interest in a Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Case for Continued Efforts 11 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L 39, 43 (1978).
67 See GATT Analytical Index, supra note 14, at 1011, for details of regular and special
sessions, for example, the CONTRACTING PARTIES, acting jointly.
68 The 23 original signatories were joined by a further 13 States as a result of the Armency
Protocol of Oct. 10,1949 (62 U.N.T.S. 122), the Torquay Protocol of Apr. 21,1951 (142 U.N.T.S.
34), and the Dillon Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, July 16, 1962 (440 U.N.T.S. 2) and
May 6, 1963 (501 U.N.T.S. 304).
69 JACKSON, supra note 19, at 123
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from a practice commonly found in international relations of negotiat-
ing an issue to consensus outside the meeting in which the formal ac-
tion takes place. This practice gives practical recognition to the issue
of power in deliberations and the issue of vital trading interests among
the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT.
Indeed, it became common GAT practice for decisions of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES (and also the Council) to be prepared in
advance in committees and working parties. Often, informal negotia-
tions, mostly in restricted groups, were carried out beforehand in the
Director-General's office or elsewhere in order to reach a consensus
that would permit the submission of a draft decision to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES (or the GAT Council).70
The use of consensus in sessions of the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES has proven to be a device to which States can ascribe safely with
the knowledge that this consensus ad idem will not jeopardize any pre-
viously agreed positions between individual contracting parties and
will mask any differences which may exist between them. Therefore,
in the case of GAT, consensus has served the primary purpose of
seeking to address controversial points through the use of negotiation,
or mediation, rather than through more formal mechanisms. This re-
inforces the general character of the General Agreement as a forum
for ongoing negotiations in trade matters and the notion of GAT as
a model of law as process.
Since the ultimate aim of consensus is to reach something ap-
proaching unanimity, the importance of negotiations as a means of
resolving underlying conflicts is inherent to the technique and its suc-
cess.7 1 It also allows participants in the process to identify with the
result as a whole, even if dissent is registered on details.72 However,
the consensus process is far from transparent. This lack of trans-
parency is one of the key imperfections of this form of participation
and one which does not laud the institutional effectiveness of the pro-
cess. Most negotiations that precede the formal consensus decision in
a plenary body, such as the former sessions of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, are conducted privately and leave no trace in the records
which might facilitate solutions to future questions of interpretation.73
Decision-making at the international level is not only divorced from
70 LONG, supra note 63, at 55.
71 Zemanek, supra note 21, at 876.
72 Consensus is "compatible with objections and reservations, provided, however, that they
do not affect major points of the decision to be taken. Antonio Cassese, Consensus and Some of
its Pitfalls, 58 RIVqSTA Durro INTERNAZIONALE 754 (1975).
73 ScHui.mRRs & BLOKKER, supra note 22, at 515
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national constituencies but is inevitably influenced by policy makers
and special interest groups within the institutional sphere. Decision-
making by consensus can frequently involve protracted negotiations
to achieve the desired "concurrence of views," or feelings, and to
avoid express decisions.74
Within the GATT, consensus may also have served other func-
tions. As Jackson suggests, it may have partially substituted for
weighted voting in an important international economic forum (the
argument stills holds true for the WTO).75 Where weighted, voting is
the primary means of decision-making, as in the IMF; thus, consensus
may fulfill a different, supplementary role. The use of consensus by
the Executive Board of the IMF can have a mitigating effect on the
Board's weighted voting and provide a response to the accusation of
developing countries that a few rich member states might otherwise
set policies that are against their interests.76
In this instance, a decision made "by the sense of the meeting"
does not mean that the weighted votes are irrelevant. On the con-
trary, such consensus indicates that a position adopted at a Board
meeting is supported by the executive directors, who have sufficient
votes to carry the issue, if it were put to a vote. Thus, the consensus
technique, in the absence of a formal vote, reinforces the underlying
balance of economic power implicit in weighted voting organizations.
Another feature of consensus decision-making under the General
Agreement, is that its informality, previously allowed provisional and
de facto parties "to participate without regard for their formal lack of
vote."' 77 The use of consensus has also been justified as "institutional
practice," formal voting being replaced by a consensus of the attend-
ing contracting parties in order "to obviate the almost impossible task
of convening all the contracting parties at a particular moment. '7
8
Finally, consensus decision-making, as opposed to unanimity, al-
lows interpretative declarations or explanatory statements to be made
after the presiding officer (in the case of the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES, the Chairman) has announced that consensus has been reached.
74 Id. at 507.
75 It will be recalled that both the IMF and IBRD utilise weighted voting, whereby votes are
allocated to Members based upon their share in the capital of the relevant organization. Other
international economic institutions have followed suit, viz., the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the African Development Bank
(AfDB), see Zamora, supra note 28, at 576-77.
76 VAN MEERHAEGHE, supra note 59, at 49; ScHFRmERs & BLOKKER, supra note 22, at 514
77 JACKSON, supra note 19, at 123, 145.
78 LONG, supra note 63, at 55.
Role of Consensus in GATTWTO
17:653 (1996-97)
Thus, the role of consensus decision-making under the General
Agreement resembles the role which interpretative declarations play
in the law of treaties, where such declarations are preferred to the
filing of a reservation to a particular treaty obligation.7 9 Of 'course,
such declarations may vary in content and, thus, in significance. Nev-
ertheless, the making of explanatory statements is common practice
under the General Agreement, even though a larger number of re-
corded instances are found in the GATT Council's practice than in the
sessions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
D. The Use of Consensus as a Decision-making Process by the
Council
How does the use of consensus in the GATT Council compare to
its use by CONTRACTING PARTIES? The Council of Representa-
tives of GATT Contracting Parties, established by Decision of June 4,
1960, terminated the Intersessional Committee and replaced it with a
standing body. In that Decision certain voting requirements were laid
down. It was stated that:
Pending further consideration by the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the
question of voting, no action by the Council, other than action relating
to its own procedures, may be taken by an affirmative vote of less than
the absolute number of affirmative votes by which such action could
have been taken by the CONTRACTING PARTIES under the relevant
provisions of the General Agreement and the rules of procedure for ses-
sions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.80
The practice of the GATT Council in such matters has proven
very different. The Council has shown a marked preference for the
use of consensus, the lead being taken by the Chairman at Council
meetings."'
However, the meaning of the term "consensus" has not always
been consistent in GATT Council practice. At the March 1981 Coun-
cil Meeting, the Council Chairman, addressing a working party report
on possible limitation of EEC subsidization of sugar exports, stated
that "in his view, consensus was understood in GATT to mean that no
delegation maintained its objections to a text or attempted to prevent
79 D. M. McRae, The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations, 49 B=IT. Y.B. INT'L L155
(1978). See also D. Vignes, The Impact of International Organizations On the Development and
Application of Public International Law, in Tir S-Rucrum AND PROCESS, supra note 17, at
837.
80 Decision of 4 June, 1960, Establishing the Council of Representatives, GAIT B.I.S.D.
(9th Supp.) at 8 (1961). See also GATr ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 14, at 1100, on the
practice of the Intersessional Committee.
81 LONG, supra note 63, at 55.
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its adoption."'82 In this instance, consensus is essentially a non-objec-
tion procedure or a form of passive consensus. It is passive in charac-
ter because it typifies the decision to refrain from taking a decision; to
do otherwise might lead to paralysis of action. In contrast, the actual
role that consensus plays in the formulation of any working party re-
port is pro-active because consensus assists in the process of negotia-
tion and compromise which leads to that report. Formal recognition
of the customary practice of consensus in the formulation of working
party reports is found in the Annex to the 1979 Understanding Re-
garding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance.83
Additionally, the representatives of the Contracting Parties to the
General Agreement hold considerably diverse views as to what con-
sensus embodies. As an example, during the discussion surrounding
the U.S. request for a panel on "EEC - Payments and Subsidies Paid
to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-feed
Proteins," the representative of Australia stated that his delegation
believed the Chairman could determine that a consensus could be
found even if there was no unanimity, a view which did not go uncon-
tested.84 The representative of India, backed by Brazil, Mexico, Ja-
maica, and Peru, maintained that if a contracting party stated that it
did not believe a consensus to exist, then the Chairman of any GATT
body could not determine otherwise. "As long as his assessment was
not contested, any chairman could conclude that there was a consen-
sus; but once that consensus was formally disputed, contested, or ob-
jected to by a contracting party, the consensus could not be said to
exist. ' 85 This approach views consensus as a process, or technique, for
reaching a decision. At the same time, it equates the consensus tech-
nique with that of unanimity.
Since 1968, and until the entry into force of the WTO, the GATT
Council (acting for the CONTRACTING PARTIES), or the annual
82 Discussion of L5113, Director General's report to the Council on Article XVI:1 discus-
sions on "EEC-Refunds on Exports of Sugar," adopted on March 10, 1981, B.I.S.D., (28th
Supp.) at 80.
83 Paragraph 6 (i) of the Annex to the Understanding states:
The report of the Working Party represents the views of all its members and therefore
records different views if necessary. Since the tendency is to strive for consensus, there is
generally some measure of negotiation and compromise in the formulation of the Working
Party's report.
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, Nov.
28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 217 (1980).
84 Doe. /6328 (request for a panel). See GATY] ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 14, at 1022.
85 Id.
670
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Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, adopted panel reports
through the process of consensus. This practice remained unwritten,
although it gained some formal recognition in paragraph (x) of the
1982 Ministerial Decision.8 6 The GATT's unwritten principle on con-
sensus decision-making had a different application in practice because
defendant governments had the power to block any phase of the dis-
pute settlement process, including, until 1988, the request for a panel
and the adoption of an adverse ruling by the Council.87 At one time,
just prior to the Ministerial Meeting of 1982, the European Commu-
nity actually supported a procedural reform for strengthening the dis-
pute settlement system which would have allowed the application of
the "consensus-minus-two" principle. This procedure effectively
would have barred two parties to a dispute from participating in deci-
sions on their own cases.
Not only did the Community's proposal fail, but the Community
actually retreated from the position.88 Instead, it sought reaffirmation
of the traditional rights of parties to participate in the consensus deci-
sion-making process and thereby affect the outcome of that decision
by blocking it, if it was in a party's vital interests to do so. In 1982, the
practice of consensus for the adoption of panel reports was reinforced
during the Uruguay Round when, in 1988, the so-called Montreal
Mid-Term Review Agreement on Improvements to the GATT Dis-
pute Settlement Rules and Procedures (Improvements Decision) was
approved without anything of substance being added.8 9 The GATT
Council's use of consensus for the adoption of panel reports also pro-
86 It stated that "the CONTRACTING PARTIES reaffirmed that consensus will continue to
be the traditional method of resolving disputes .... " Ministerial Declaration, 38th Session at the
Ministerial Level, Nov. 29, 1982, Doc. 15424 GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 16 (1983).
87 Major disputes which have resulted in the adoption of a panel report being blocked in
Council have been: United States - Tax Legislation (DISC), Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23rd
Supp.) at 98-147 (1977); Spain - Measures Concerning Domestic Sale of Soyabean Oil, Doc. L/
5142, 1981 GATrPD LEXIS 2 (Nov. 3, 1981); United States - Imports of Certain Automotive
Spring Assemblies, May 26, 1983, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 107-28 (1984); German Ex-
change Rate Scheme for Deutsche Airbus, SCM/142, 1992 GATITPD LEXIS 13 (Mar. 4, 1992);
and EEC- Import Regime for Bananas, DS38/R, 1994 GATTPD LEXIS 1 (Feb. 11, 1994). See
also Petersmann, supra note 6, at 1192-93; R. E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW. TIm EvoLtrrION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 165 (1993).
88 HUDEC, supra note 87.
89 Rule G.3 Adoption of Panel Reports simply states:
The parties to a dispute shall have the right to participate fully in the consideration of the
panel report by the Council, and their views shall be fully recorded. The practice of adopt-
ing panel reports by consensus shall be continued, without prejudice to the GATT provi-
sions on decision-making which remain applicable. However, the delaying of the process of
dispute settlement shall be avoided.
GATT: Decisions Adopted at the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 8, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1023, 1033 (1989). For approval of the contracting parties, see Improvements to the
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vides an example of the "power-orientated" approach to dispute set-
tlement within the GATI. It may have provided some governments
with a freer hand to wield economic influence than was available to
them on other policy matters, such as tariff negotiations or the imple-
mentation of such trade disciplines, as the countervailing of subsidies.
These latter policies are more likely to attract the direct economic in-
terests of constituents back home and call for political approval than
dispute settlement proceedings. Nevertheless, the process has not
been without its drawbacks. The application of the consensus tech-
nique by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) did not undergo signifi-
cant change until the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Understanding)90 that forms
Annex 2 of the agreements, appended to the WTO Agreement, and
the introduction of an integrated dispute settlement system in the
GATT/WTO. Article 2:4 of the Understanding specifically allows that
"where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for
the DSB to take a decision, it shall do so by consensus;" however, an
interpretative footnote adds the twist. The footnote states that "the
DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter sub-
mitted for its consideration, if no member, present at the meeting of
the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed
decision."'" In essence, the DSB uses quasi-automatic decision-mak-
ing procedures for the establishment of a panel,' the adoption of
panel reports,93 and the adoption of Appellate Body reports94 unless
GATr Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at
66 (1990).
90 Marrakesh, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 404. The text of this and other dispute settle-
ment procedures can also be found in The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: A Collection of
Legal Texts, WTO 1 (1995) [hereinafter WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures].
91 WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, supra note 90, at 2.
92 Article 6:1 Understanding states:
If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest at the DSB
meeting following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB's agenda,
unless at that meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel.
Marrakesh, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 410; WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, supra
note 90, at 8.
93 The relevant section of Article 16:4 Understanding states:
Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report
shall be adopted at a DSB meeting, unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB
of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report....
Marrakesh, LEGAL TExTs, supra note 1, at 417; WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, supra
note 90, at 17.
94 Article 17:14 Understanding in Marrakesh, LEGAL TEx-rs, supra note 1, at 419; WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Procedures, supra note 90, at 19.
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there is a "negative consensus" not so to adopt.95 This understanding
of the consensus decision-making process moves away from the idea
of a non-objection process and toward proactive decision-making. 96
This development reflects the diffusion of interests of WTO Members
in the dispute settlement system yet also allows for the higher levels of
participation required for the effective system-level action.
E. The Use of Consensus as a Decision-making Process by the
Council of the European Communities under the
Luxembourg Accords
The GAT[ CONTRACTING PARTIES' use of consensus as a
mechanism for decision-making does not readily find a counterpart in
other institutional settings, particularly where such uses are of a supra-
national type, as in the European Union. The early practice of the
European Economic Community or EEC (renamed the European
Community (EC) or (TEU) by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty), is one
example of consensus being equated with unanimity. Originally, pro-
visions of the Treaties of the European Communities required una-
nimity,97 or a qualified majority, for voting in the Council.98 When a
qualified majority was applicable, the voting rules of Article 148:2 EC
95 See also the use of consensus for the granting of requests for the suspension of concessions
in the case of non-implementation of dispute settlement rulings (Article 22:6 Understanding),
Marrakesh, LEGAL TEXTs, supra note 1, at 424; WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, supra
note 90, at 25.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 24-48.
97 This held good until entry into force of the Single European Act on July 1, 1987, Single
European Act, Feb. 17 and 28, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 506, when various decisions
previously requiring unanimity were replaced by qualified majority voting. See P. J. G.
KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNiTiEs 247, 247-48 (2d ed. 1990); SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 22, at 511-12.
98 Upon the entry into force in July 1969 of the 1965 Merger Treaty, the three Councils of the
Communities (European Economic Community, Euratom and the European Coal and Steel
Community) were fused into one Council, consisting of representatives of each of the Member
States. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Singe Commission of the European Coin-
munites [1967] J.0. 152/2; Cmnd 4866 (1972). In present practice, the term "European Council"
is sometimes used to describe the meetings of the heads of governments of the Member States
and thus forms part of the political process, and its usage is to be distinguished from the Council
of the European Communities; such meetings were never envisaged in the founding treaties but
have nevertheless been formalized under the Single European Act. See KAPTEYN & VERLORPEN
VAN THEMAAT supra note 97. It should also be noted that the Maastricht Treaty introduced a
further distinction between the "European Council," as an organ of the European Union, in the
sense of Article D, TEU, and the "Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or
of Government," as an organ of the European Community. The Maastricht Treaty, 1992, Euro-
pean Union, Title I, art. D; and the Treaty of Rome, Article 109J:2 EC.
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or Article 118:2 Euratom were relevant.99 Upon each successive en-
largement of the European Communities, the number of votes needed
to obtain a qualified majority changed, with a corresponding adjust-
ment of the "weighting" of votes of the Member States. If a decision
in the Council was not being taken on the basis of a proposal from the
Commission, a certain number of Member States were required to
vote in its favor.100
During the transitional period, the unanimity rule was replaced in
a growing number of fields. In January 1966, the third stage of the
transitional period began, resulting in matters of great importance to
the six Member States, such as policies on transport, agriculture, and
external trade, being regulated by the Council by qualified majority
voting (q.m.v.). The imminent entry into force of q.m.v. in the agricul-
tural sector had led France to forgo sending a minister to Council
meetings in the second half of 1965 as a sign of its opposition to an
unlimited application of qualified majorities. 101 General de Gaulle
viewed the use of qualified majority as contrary to the dignity of the
state, devoid of the reality of power and inapplicable if the vital inter-
ests of one or more Community partners were at stake.10 2
The other five governments (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands) were unwilling to accept the French view;
a constitutional crisis in the EC was avoided only by the adoption of
the so-called "Luxembourg Accords" of January 28-29, 1966. In sec-
tion (b) of the Luxembourg Accords under the heading Majority vot-
ing procedure, the wording reflects the Member States' ultimate
adoption, in part, of the French Government view. As a result, deci-
sions taken by majority vote on a proposal of the Commission respect-
ing important interests of one or more partners required other
Members of the Council to take account of such interests when they
deliberated and to try to find a solution which was mutually accepta-
ble within a reasonable period of time.10 3 The view of the French, to
99 Article 148:2 Treaty of Rome, supra note 55; Article 118:2, Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Rome, March 25, 1957.
100 This number was four Member States. Currently, after the changes brought about by the
TEU, Article 148:2 requires 62 votes in favor of acts adopted on a proposal from the Commis-
sion and 62 votes in favor, cast by at least 10 Member States, in other cases. Treaty of Rome,
March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 70.
101 KAPTFYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 97, at. 248.
102 VIGNES, supra note 79, at 838.
103 The Luxembourg Accords, section (b), I., EC Bulletin (1966:3), at 8. It should be noted
that this compromise was -written down after a Council session on January 28 and 29, 1996, but
never adopted, either as an amendemnt to the Treaty of Rome or as a Council Decision. Despite
having no legal force it governed de facto the life of the Community for nearly 20 years; See
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which the other Member States did not ascribe, was expressed as fol-
lows: "[T]he French delegation considers that where very important
interests are at stake the discussion must be continued until unani-
mous agreement is reached;"'" for example, until there was a consen-
sus in the sense of the end product of the decision-making process.
°5
Despite the divergence of views between the partners on the use of
the consensus rule, the European Communities, being pragmatic,
were willing to accept that this difference of opinion would bar the
resumption of activities concerning the normal procedure.
0 6
Notwithstanding the pragmatism of the "six," this approach, from a
decision-making point of view, is questionable. The significance of
qualified majority rule was seriously undermined by the circumstances
worked out in the Luxembourg Accords. As Kapteyn and Verloren
van Themaat have pointed out:
[I]ts significance resides in the fact that its application is not a foregone
conclusion, rather than in its relentless application. The mere existence
of the rule, even if it were to be applied only rarely, promotes the attain-
ment of an acceptable compromise, because it calls for an accommodat-
ing and reasonable attitude on the part of the members of the Council as
long as they are in doubt whether the rule will or will not be applied."0 7
In practical terms, it led to the abandonment of voting in the
Council in favour of consensus decision-making, even on matters
where no important interests were at stake. By 1969, the practice of
the Council was compared to proceedings in inter-governmental nego-
tiations; the distinction between a Community institution and an inter-
governmental organization had become blurredY°8 The situation did
not improve immediately. The 1972 accession of Denmark, Ireland,
and the United Kingdom brought about the first enlargement of the
European Communities from six to nine. Despite a call at the 1974
Paris summit to renounce the practice of making agreement condi-
tional upon the unanimous consent of the Member States, the practice
continued until 1982, when the Community fixed agricultural prices by
a qualified majority (with Denmark, Greece, and the United Kingdom
abstaining).
Eventually, a change in the Council's rules of procedure in 1987
- whereby the Council votes on the initiative of the President of the
Encylopaedia of European Union Law: Constitutional Texts (Neville March Hennings gen. ed.,
1996).
104 Luxembourg Accords, supra note 103, § (b), II.
105 Id. § 2(i).
106 Id. § (b), 1.
107 KAPTYN & VERLOREN vAN THEMAAT, supra note 97, at 248.
108 Id. at 285.
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Council and the President is required to open voting procedures on
the invitation of a Council Member or the European Commission
whenever a majority of the Members are in favour - led to the
breaking of the taboo on q.m.v. majority voting and a showing of
greater flexibility in decision-making. 10 9 Furthermore, items for which
a vote could be requested had to be specified in the provisional
agenda and sent to Member States at least fourteen days before the
meeting at which the vote was to be taken.110 The entry into force of
the Single European Act"' heralded an extension of the areas in
which qualified majority voting could take place, particularly through
the cooperation procedure with the European Parliament. This has
now been strengthened through the co-decision procedure, introduced
under the Maastricht Treaty, into Article 189b EC.112
F. The Institutionalization of Decision-making by Consensus
Formalization of the process of decision-making by consensus in
the international community began in 1971 when the UN General As-
sembly introduced consensus into its rules of procedure. Resolution
2837 (XXVI) approved the conclusions of the Special Committee on
the Rationalization of the Procedures and Organization of the Gen-
eral Assembly that the adoption of decisions and resolutions by con-
sensus was desirable when it contributed to the effective and lasting
settlement of differences, thereby strengthening the authority of the
UN.113 However, this procedure was without prejudice to the right of
every member state to set forth its views in full." 4 This qualification
109 SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 22, at 512. However, Schermers and Blokker note
that on occasion Member States have threatened to invoke the Luxembourg Accords in order to
block decision-making in cases where they could be out-voted under the TEU. One such exam-
ple was France in the Blair House agreement on agricultdral trade, concluded between the Euro-
pean Commission and the U.S. towards the end of the GATr Uruguay Round. Id. at 512 n.159.
110 See Amendment of the Council's Rules of Procedure Adopted by the Council on 20 July
1987, 1987 O3. (L 291) 27; ScHaEumRs & BLOKER, supra note 22, at 512.
111 Under the Single European Act of 1986, the requirement of unanimity was replaced by
that of a qualified majority in respect of Articles 28, 49, 57, 70, 75 and 84 EEC. See Single
European Act, supra note 97.
112 Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Maastricht, amending the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 189b, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 66, 31 I.L.M. 247, 297
(1992).
113 Report of the Special Committee on the Rationalization of the Procedures and Organiza-
tion of the Geneal Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 26, par. 289, U.N. Doe A/8426
(1971), U.N. Doe. A/8426, (1971), quoted in Zemanek, supra note 21, at 864.
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appears to have been necessary since some States had adopted the
practice of filing reservations to consensus shortly before that time.
115
Soon afterward, a further development occurred - the
mandatory replacement of majority rule by consensus as a means of
decision-making in the rules of procedure of international organiza-
tions. The first recorded instance of a procedural rule on consensus
occurred in one of two UN conferences. During a meeting of the
Population Commission of ECOSOC, when preparing the rules of
procedure for the 1974 Population Conference to be held in
Bucharest, the Romanian delegate proposed that the President of the
Conference should be able to recommend that "the decisions on im-
portant matters of substance shall be taken, if possible, by consensus."
The Commission initially rejected the proposal in favour of a recom-
mendation which considered decision-making on the basis of consen-
sus to be, according to UN practice, "general agreement without a
vote, but not necessarily unanimity."" 6 This recommendation was at-
tached to the draft Rules of Procedure drawn up by ECOSOC and
subsequently approved in Resolution 1835 (LVI). The World Popula-
tion Conference subsequently adopted both, annexing the recommen-
dation to its Rules of Procedure."
7
The second and more complex instance of the institutionalization
of consensus as a decision-making procedure was adopted by the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III). When the General Assembly met at its 28th session in 1973 and
decided to convene UNCLOS III, already there was a bitter and pro-
tracted debate in the First Committee of the Assembly over the work-
ing and voting procedures of the Conference. The debate finally was
resolved with a gentlemen's agreement, approved by the General As-
sembly. In order to gain the widest possible acceptance on substan-
tive matters pertaining to problems of ocean space and the seabed, it
was agreed that the Conference should try to reach agreement on sub-
115 Zemanek, supra note 21, at 864.
116 The Committee was influenced by the statement of the Director of the General Legal
Division of the UN Secretariat who described consensus as "a practice under which every effort
is made to achieve unanimous agreement; but if that could not be done, those dissenting from
the general trend were prepared simply to make their position or reservations known and placed
on record." Population Commission: Report on the Third Session, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 3A, par. 64, U.N. Doc. A/5462 (1974), reprinted in Summary of a Statement Made at
the 311th Meeting of the Population Commission, March 6, 1974, 1974 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 163,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/12. 12
117 See Daniel Vignes, Will the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea Work According to the
Consensus Rule?, 69 AM. J .INT'_ L 119, 121 (1975) (referring to Res. 1835 (LVI) of May 14,
1974); Zemanek, supra note 21, at 865, 874.
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stantive matters by way of consensus and that no voting on such mat-
ters should take place until all efforts at consensus had been
exhausted.
Similar to the adoption by the Population Commission of
ECOSOC of the recommendation-on the use of consensus, the gentle-
men's agreement embodying the consensus rule on decision-making
formed the basis for a declaration by the President of UNCLOS III
which was subsequently endorsed and appended to the Rules of Pro-
cedure.118 In the case of UNCLOS III, however, a novel feature was
added. Rule 37, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure specifically
introduced the notion of consensus when it stated, "before a matter of
substance is put to the vote, a determination that all efforts at reach-
ing general agreement have been exhausted shall be made by the ma-
jority specified in paragraph I of Rule 39."119
The practice on adoption of Rules of Procedure at major interna-
tional conferences has been mixed since the UNCLOS III gentlemen's
agreement. Only the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope,120 , in Rule 69.4 of its Rules of Procedures, provides that deci-
sions of the conference are to be taken by consensus. For this
conference, consensus is ... the absence of any objection expressed
by a Representative and submitted by him as a constituting an obsta-
cle to the taking of the decision in question.'
121
However, not all attempts at introducing consensus into the fo-
rum of an international conference are necessarily bound to succeed,
as revealed by the recently convened First Conference of the Parties
118 The Declaration incorporating the "Gentlemen's agreement" made by the President and
endorsed by the Conference at its 19th meeting, June 27, 1994, stated:
Bearing in mind that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be
considered as a whole and the desirability of adopting a Convention on the Law of the Sea
which will secure the widest possible acceptance.
The Conference should make every effort to reach agreement on substantive matters by
way of consensus and there should be no voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus
have been exhausted.
Buzan, supra note 24, at 348, citing U.N. Doc. AICONF.621WP.21Rev.2 at 8-10, 17 (1976).
119 Id. at 347. Rule 39 states that decisions on substance require a two-thirds majority of the
representatives present and voting, with at least a majority of the States participating in the
session of the Conference. Id. at 348.
120 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, August 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M.
1292 (1975). Four successive follow-up meetings have been held at Belgrade, Madrid, Vienna,
and Helsinki; at the last of these held on December 6, 1994, it was decided to change the name of
the organization from CSCE to OSCE - the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe - as of January 1, 1995, in order to reflect its enhanced role and contribution towards
security, stability and cooperation in the region. Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe: Budapest Summit Declaration on Genuine Partnership in a New Era, Dec. 6, 1994, 34
I.L.M. 764, 773 (1995).
121 Zemanek, supra note 21, at 866; ScsmFm-Rs & BLOKKER, supra note 22, at 506.
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to the UN Convention on Climate Change.122 Despite the number of
agreements reached at the Berlin Session of this conference, parties
failed to adopt a decision on the rules of procedure to govern future
conferences. 1' The failure resulted from a disagreement over the po-
tential application of the consensus decision-making procedure. A
number of parties, keen that no further greenhouse gas emission re-
duction commitments be undertaken, insisted upon the adoption of
consensus because they believed that consensus would enable them to
veto emissions' control progress.' 24  Other parties, who wanted such
controls to continue, pressed for majority voting in order to protect
their vital interests.125 More success in formalizing decision-making
by consensus has been achieved in some functional organizations, 26
as well as regional economic arrangements. 27 However, the constitu-
ent documents of these organizations are not always clear regarding
exactly what is meant by the adoption of decisions by consensus.
A preference for decision-making by consensus has been carried
over into the WTO, which states in Article IX, WTO Agreement on
Decision-Making, that "the WTO shall continue the practice of deci-
sion-making by consensus followed under the GATT 1947. '1128 What
122 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties:
Decisions Adopted by the First Session (Berlin), Mar. 28-Apr. 7, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1671 (1995)
[hereinafter Berlin Climate Change Conference].
123 Cf. Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Enviromental Facility,
March 16, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1273 (1994) [hereinafter Global Environmental Facility], where para-
graph 25 of the Instrument addresses Principles of Decision-making and paragraph 25(b) more
specifically prescribes:
Decisions of the Assembly and the Council shall be taken by consensus. In the case of the
Council if, in the consideration of any matter of substance, all practicable efforts by the
Council and its Chairperson have been made and no consensus appears attainable, any
member of the Council may require a formal vote.
Id. at 1291.
124 Berlin Climate Change Conference, supra note 122, at 1673.
125 Id.
126 See International Sugar Agreement 1992, March 20, 1992, 1219 U.N.T.S. 135, 141-42; In-
ternational Agreement on Olive Oil and Table Olives, July 1, 1986, U.N. Doc. TD/SUGAR.12/6.
127 See Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Republic, the Federa-
tive Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, 26 Mar.
1991, art. 16, 30 I.L.M. 1041, 1048 [MERCOSUR Treaty]("[D]ecisions of the Council of the
common market and the Common Market Group shall be taken by consensus, with all States
Parties present"); Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, June 3,1991, art. 10:1,
30 I.L.M. 1241 ("Unless otherwise provided in this Treaty, decisions of the Assembly shall be
adopted by consensus, failing that, by a two-thirds majority of Member States"); Treaty Estab-
lishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, November 5, 1993, art. 8:4 & 9:6,
33 I.L.M. 1067, 1077 (1994) ("The decisions of the Authority shall be taken by consensus.")
("The decisions of the Council shall be taken by consensus, failing which, by two-thirds majority
of the members of the Council.").
128 Marrakesh, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 11
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is understood by consensus is qualified in a footnote as: "The body
concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter
submitted for its consideration, if no member, present at the meeting
when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision."
Therefore, despite the strides that have been made in the field of dis-
pute settlement where consensus decision-making on the establish-
ment of a panel, the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report, or
the instigation of retaliatory measures, is concerned, consensus deci-
sion-making is proactive and orientated towards a result, elsewhere in
ordinary decision-making processes consensus is of the defensive,
non-objection type.
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The above contribution examined the evolution of congensus in
GATT decision-making and traced its use and development by the
GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES and the GATT Council. The
consensus technique in GATT was compared and contrasted with its
similar application in other international fora, notably in other inter-
national economic organizations like the IMEF and the World Bank as
well as in the UN system at large. On a regional level, comparisons
were drawn with the use of consensus as a decision-making process
within the European Communities under the Luxembourg Accords of
1966. The use of consensus in decision-making in both international
and regional fora has increased significantly in the past three decades,
particularly in the sphere of international economic relations and the
management of natural resources. Development of the consensus
technique in practice born in its active and passive forms has subse-
quently been formalized at the international and regional level, nota-
bly in the domain of international conferences, or conferences of the
parties to international conventions (not dissimilar to the contracting
parties to the former GATT), and more recently in the WTO Agree-
ment, as well as in a number of regional agreements on economic
integration.
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